Learned Changes in Stimulus Representations (A Personal History) by Hall, Geoffrey
Almost 40 years ago I began what turned out to be a programme of research on the way in which
experience can change the effectiveness of the events used as stimuli in standard associative
learning procedures. In this personal history I will describe my early (failed) attempts to find
evidence for the acquired distinctiveness of cues, and my conclusion that experience tends to
reduce, not enhance the associability of stimuli. I then go on to describe my attempts to square
this conclusion with the stubborn empirical fact that, in some circumstances, pretraining with (or
preexposure to) stimuli, can facilitate subsequent discrimination between them. I describe
experiments (conducted mostly with rats as the subjects) showing how some of these effects can
be explained in associative terms. Others, however, seemed to demand an explanation in terms
of a new learning process that modulates the effective salience of stimuli. I go on to describe
attempts to specify the nature of this process, and (bringing the story up to date) to describe
recent experiments investigating the effects of salience modulation in human perceptual learning.
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Hace casi 40 años, empecé lo que con el tiempo se convirtió en un programa de investigación
sobre la forma en que la experiencia puede cambiar la efectividad de los eventos empleados
como estímulos en procedimientos típicos de aprendizaje asociativo. En esta historia personal,
describiré mis primeros (fallidos) intentos de demostrar la distintividad adquirida de las claves,
y mi conclusión de que la experiencia tiende a reducir, en vez de a facilitar, la asociabilidad de
los estímulos. Después paso a describir mis intentos de hacer compatible esta conclusión con
el innegable hecho empírico de que, en algunas circunstancias, el pre-entrenamiento con (o la
pre-exposición a) los estímulos puede facilitar la posterior discriminación entre ellos. Describo
los experimentos (llevados a cabo con ratas como sujetos) que muestran cómo algunos de estos
efectos pueden explicarse en términos asociativos. Sin embargo, otros parecen exigir una
explicación en términos de un nuevo proceso de aprendizaje que modula la saliencia efectiva
de los estímulos.  Paso a describir los intentos de especificar la naturaleza de este proceso y
(llegando al momento actual) a describir los experimentos recientes que investigan los efectos
de modulación de la saliencia en el aprendizaje perceptual humano.
Palabras clave: aprendizaje asociativo, discriminación estimular, pre-entrenamiento, saliencia
estimular, aprendizaje perceptual
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As I sat down to prepare this article the (somewhat
disconcerting) thought occurred to me that it will appear in print
almost exactly 40 years after I first started working on the issues
it will discuss. Looking back on what had been done over those
years provoked a mixture of feelings. What came to mind first
was a consciousness of the mistakes that I had made –
hypotheses, carefully nurtured, that turned out to be false; and
worse, empirical phenomena, vigorously investigated, that turned
out to be blind alleys, leading nowhere. But not all was gloom.
I also thought that I could discern a central theme in which
(with extensive help from others, both in my own laboratory,
and elsewhere) I had been able to contribute to a genuine
advance in our understanding. This theme (although this was
not immediately apparent to me) concerns the comprehensiveness
of associative theory. When I first learned about conditioning
and its effects I thought that here was a process that had the
potential to provide a firm basis for the analysis of what I took
to be the central topic of psychology – the phenomenon of
individual adaptation (the way in which individuals interacted
with their environment, are changed by the experience and go
on to interact again in a different way). I began to hope that the
laws of association might provide for the science of psychology
what Mendel’s laws had given to the science of genetics.
But there was a difficulty. It was not so much that many
instances of learning, as experienced in everyday life, were
not immediately explicable in associative terms – the
complexity of these phenomena might make analysis difficult,
but this does not, in itself, prove that an associative analysis
is impossible. More worrying was the fact that, even with
the restricted area of animal learning itself, there appeared
to be a range of phenomena that challenged the adequacy of
associative theorizing. Foremost among these (to my mind)
were observations that seemed to imply a process of
perceptual learning. Associative theory concerned itself with
the mechanisms by which experience forged links of various
sorts between the central representations of events; it found
no place for the possibility that the nature of these
representations might be modified by experience. Not only
would a theory that failed to deal with such things fall short
of comprehensiveness; it would also run the risk of being
rendered predictively impotent – if the nature of the central
representation that is activated by a stimulus changes from
one presentation to the next, we cannot be sure that the
behaviour established on the first presentation will be evoked
by the second. This matter seemed important enough to merit
direct investigation. In what follows I will describe my own
contributions to this investigation, past and present, ending
with some speculations about what the future may hold.
The Past
Analyzer Theory
In the 1960s, Sutherland and his student Mackintosh
developed a theory of the role of attention in animal
discrimination learning that became known as analyzer
theory (see Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971). The essential
notion was that, in addition to forging associative links,
discrimination training also engaged an attentional learning
process that focussed attention on the relevant dimension
of difference (strengthened the relevant analyzer). Central
to this account was the phenomenon of the acquired
distinctiveness of cues, first demonstrated for animal
discrimination learning by Lawrence (1949). His experiments
were taken show that when animals had been trained on
one discrimination with a given set of cues, they were better
able to learn a new, quite different task, involving these
same cues. The change in the nature of the task meant that
this transfer could not be response-based and must therefore,
it was argued, depend on some change in the way that the
stimuli themselves were processed.
I will return to acquired distinctiveness shortly, but when
I began my doctoral research in 1968 I focussed on another
phenomenon thought to support analyzer theory. This was
the overtraining reversal effect, the paradoxical observation
that rats trained on a simultaneous discrimination learned the
reversal of this task more readily when they had been given
overtraining on the original (e.g., Mackintosh, 1969). The
interpretation offered by analyzer theory was that overtraining
was so effective in strengthening the relevant analyzer that
the beneficial effects of sustained attention to the relevant
dimension were able to outweigh any potential disadvantages
of such training. My own experiments were successful in
replicating the basic effect, but revealed a number of features
that made me doubt the attentional explanation (e.g., Hall,
1973). Perhaps the most critical was the finding that
overtraining was capable of fostering later learning even when
the stimuli were quite different from those used in initial
training (Hall, 1974). The source of this positive transfer
appeared to lie in the development of particular response-
based strategies, and did not require the assumption that
overtraining enhanced the degree of attention paid to the cues.
This did not, of course, constitute a proof that attention is
insensitive to modulation by experience; indeed the work I
did next confirmed that it was (although not in the way
envisaged by the Sutherland and Mackintosh theory).
Stimulus Associability and Latent Inhibition
In the mid 1970s, research on these matters turned to the
use of classical conditioning procedures, prompted principally
by Kamin’s (1968) discovery of blocking—an effect that, at
first sight, seemed to indicate a role for learned changes in
attention. John Pearce and I decided to use the conditioned
suppression procedure to explore the phenomenon of acquired
distinctiveness. In the first of our attempts (Pearce & Hall,
1978) we trained rats on a discrimination between a
reinforced stimulus (A+) and a nonreinforced compound of
this stimulus and another (AB–). We reasoned that, at
asymptote, the compound should have a net associative
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strength of zero; transfer to further training in which the
compound was used as a conditioned stimulus (CS) would
therefore be capable of revealing the distinctiveness acquired
by the cues, uncontaminated by direct associative transfer.
Transfer was indeed obtained, but to our surprise it was the
exact opposite of what we had expected. The AB compound
was learned about more slowly as a result of this pretraining
(see Figure 1). Far from acquiring distinctiveness (or the
ability to command attention) during the first phase of
training, the cues appeared to have lost it.
Further experiments, using modifications of this general
design (e.g., Hall & Pearce, 1979, 1982) confirmed the
generality of the finding and led us to adopt the general
principle that training in which a cue was reliably followed
by a given consequence would cause that cue to lose
associability. The phenomenon of latent inhibition (the
retardation of conditioning produced by prior nonreinforced
exposure to the CS) was already well known.  We simply
extended the principle, making latent inhibition a special case,
in which the stimulus consequence was no event at all. This
principle formed the basis of our formal model of conditioning
(Pearce & Hall, 1980), and we developed it (drawing liberally
on the ideas of Mackintosh, 1975) to accommodate a range
of other phenomena, including overshadowing and blocking.
Enhanced Discrimination
We were now confronted with a problem. The
experiments (and our theory) said that exposure to a stimulus
(at least when it signalled a consistent consequence) led to
a loss of associability and poorer subsequent learning. What
then, were we to make of the large body of evidence that
seemed to suggest that prior experience could facilitate
learning? This evidence came in two forms: One set of
studies dealt with the effects of prior discrimination training
on subsequent discrimination; the second set dealt with the
effects of mere exposure to the cues.
Lawrence’s (1949) experiment was the forerunner of a
large number of studies, conducted during the 1950s and
1960s, mostly with human participants (see Hall, 1991, for
a review), to demonstrate the reality of acquired
distinctiveness effects – transfer from one discrimination
task to another involving the same cues. My initial reaction
to these studies was to try to find some sort of artifact in
Figure 1. Design and results of an experiment by Pearce and Hall
(1978), using rats and the conditioned suppression procedure. Rats
in the experimental condition (Group E) were trained initially on
a discrimination in which a compound was nonreinforced (AB-),
but one of its elements was reinforced (A+). Rats in the control
condition (Group C) were trained on a discrimination between two
different cues. The graph shows the results of the subsequent test
phase in which the AB compound was reinforced for all subjects.
Train Test
Group E A+/AB– AB+
Group C X+/Y– AB+
Figure 2. Design and results of an experiment by Honey and Hall
(1989). Two groups of rats received initial discrimination training
with three cues (A, B, and C). For Group 1, A and C had a common
consequence; for Group 2, B and C had a common consequence.
After C had been associated with shock (the Conditioning phase),
generalization to A and B was tested using the conditioned
suppression procedure. The lower part of the figure shows the
result of this test.
Discrimination Conditioning Test
A → 0
Group 1 B → food C → shock A and B
C → 0
A → 0
Group 2 B → food C → shock A and B
C → food
each of them, and thus deny the reality of the effect.  But
I had to abandon this strategy when we succeeded in
generating the effects in question, in our own laboratory
and in the simplest of conditioning procedures. Figure 2
shows the design and result of one of these experiments
(Honey & Hall, 1989). This experiment showed that rats
will generalize more readily between two cues that have
previously shared the same consequence than between two
that have been pretrained with different consequences. The
latter effect is the essence of acquired distinctiveness; the
former has been termed acquired equivalence.
At the cost of disrupting the historical sequence, I will
describe a recent experiment in which the same basic effect
has been demonstrated for human subjects. The design of
the experiment (Hall, Mitchell, Graham, & Lavis, 2003) is
presented schematically in Table 1. (At this point we are
concerned only with the first two stages shown in the table;
the implications of Stage 3 will be taken up later). People
received stage-1 training with four different stimuli, four
different geometrical shapes (A-D in the table). Two, A and
B, were followed by one outcome (presentation of a red
rectangle); two (C and D) by another outcome (a green
rectangle). No overt response was required at this stage.
Stage 2 consisted of a discrimination learning task in which
the subjects had to learn to make one motor response rather
than another to each of the shapes.  Performance was good
when the subjects were required to make different responses
to stimuli that had been associated with different outcomes
in stage 1 (the consistent condition of the table) but was
relatively poor in the inconsistent condition, when they had
to make the same responses to shapes previously associated
with different outcomes.
Turning now to the effects of mere exposure; one of the
best demonstrations that facilitation effects can be obtained
even when the preexposure phase does not involve explicit
discrimination training comes from the classic study by Gibson
and Walk (1956). They gave infant rats prolonged exposure
to geometrical shapes (presented in their home cages) and
showed that this treatment improved subsequent performance
on a food-rewarded simultaneous discrimination between
these shapes. Initially I sought refuge in the possibility that
there might something special about the developing nervous
system of infant animals, and that adults given the same
treatment might show a quite different effect (i.e., retarded
learning, latent inhibition). But I quickly had to abandon this
notion. Figure 3 shows the acquisition of a simultaneous
discrimination by rats given preexposure to the cues or no
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Table 1
Experimental Design used by Hall et al. (2003)
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Group Consistent
A → red A → left
B → red B → left red → left/right?
C → green C → right green → left/right?
D → green D → right
Group Inconsistent
A → red A → left
B → red B → right red → left/right?
C → green C → left green → left/right?
D → green D → right
Note. A, B, C, and D represent visual stimuli presented on a computer monitor; red and green refer to colored rectangles. Left and right
refer to keyboard response required (left = back slash; right = forward slash).  Feedback was given after responses in Stage 2.  All
subjects in a given group received all types of trial listed under a given stage of training.
Figure 3. Results of an experiment by Hall (1979) showing the
acquisition of a simultaneous discrimination, over four 5-day
training blocks, by four groups of rats. Rats in the Exposed
condition had been given prolonged exposure to the stimuli. For
Young animals, this occurred between 40 and 80 days of age; for
Mature animals, this occurred between 120 and 160 days of age.
HALL222
such preexposure. It is evident that preexposure helps; and
that it does so whether the rats were preexposed as infants
or when mature (Hall, 1979). Subsequent experiments
confirmed the reliability of this effect and demonstrated that
it was not necessary for the exposure to be given in the home
cage (Channell & Hall, 1981). Here then was a procedure
that clearly ought to produce latent inhibition, and yet learning
was enhanced. How could this be?
The answer (in retrospect) seems obvious. Latent
inhibition refers to retarded acquisition of the CR to a single
cue; our examples of enhanced learning, on the other hand,
all came from procedures in which the subject was required
to discriminate between two similar cues. It is quite possible,
then, that prior exposure to a pair cues might reduce the
associability of each of them, but that performance on a
discrimination task could be enhanced if the preexposure
also engaged some other learning process that enabled the
animal to tell them apart better. A series of experiments
using flavour-aversion learning procedures (e.g., Honey &
Hall, 1989) found just this – acquisition of a conditioned
aversion was retarded by prior exposure to the flavour used
as the CS but discrimination between this and another similar
flavour (as assessed by a generalization test) was found to
be enhanced. The challenge, then, became that of identifying
the nature of the learning process (or processes) that
promotes the ability to distinguish between similar stimuli.
Associative Mediation in Acquired Distinctiveness
(and Equivalence)
In fact an explanation for acquired distinctiveness was
already available (and had been so since 1890 when it was
first proposed by James). Figure 4 (top part) presents a
schematic version of the associative account offered by
James (1890) for the acquired distinctiveness of cues. Recall
that in this procedure, discrimination training, in which the
cues are followed by different outcomes, enhances their
subsequent discriminability. Figure 4 shows the associations
assumed to be formed when two similar cues (A and B)
have been given training in which each has become linked
to a different associate (X an Y); the associates are less
similar (they share few common features) than are A and
B. Discrimination between A and B prior to training will
be difficult as they share many common elements. But the
formation of the associative links means that presentation
of A will produce associative activation of the representation
of X and presentation of B will associatively activate Y. As
a result discrimination between A and B will be enhanced
because the proportion of common features present in the
overall patterns of activation produced by these stimuli will
be low, given the distinctiveness of their associates. The
lower part of Figure 4 shows the situation for the procedure
(known as acquired equivalence) in which the two stimuli
are given the same associate.  Here the proportion of
common elements is increased, and discriminability should
go down. James focussed on the case in which the associates
were distinctive names, but the analysis applies when other
events are used (as in experiments with animal subjects, or
that presented in Table 1).
Whether associations of this sort are actually responsible
for acquired distinctiveness effects needs to be demonstrated.
Gibson (1969) in her influential discussion of the topic
argued that although associations might indeed be formed
during training designed to establish acquired distinctiveness,
they did not provide the mechanism for the effect. Rather
the role of discrimination training was simply to ensure that
the subjects concentrated on the stimuli, noting their
similarities and differences, with the result that there was
an increase in the perceptual effectiveness of (and attention
paid to) their intrinsic distinctive features. As we shall shortly
see, there are demonstrations of perceptual learning that
seem to demand explanation in Gibsonian terms, but this
Figure 4. Associative structures in acquired distinctiveness and
acquired equivalence. Each circle represents a stimulus (A or B)
that is made up of a set of features (or elements). Some features
are unique to a given stimulus (the a elements for A; the b elements
for B); other features (c) are held in common and thus fall into
the area of overlap of A and B. The overlapping circles represent
two similar stimuli, A and B (the area of overlap representing
features held in common); arrows represent associative links. In
the acquired distinctiveness case, A and B have formed associations
with quite different stimuli (X and Y). In the acquired equivalence
case, both have become associated with the same stimulus.
does not preclude the possibility that in some circumstances,
associative processes can also play a role.
Evidence that the associations formed during initial
training can influence subsequent discrimination
performance comes from the experiment by Hall et al.
(2003), outlined in Table 1. Why, in Stage 2, did subjects
in the inconsistent condition find it difficult to assign
different responses to cues (such as A and B) that had shared
a common associate (red) in Stage 1? According to the
associative theory, this is because the representation of red
was activated by both A and B during Stage 2. When
subjects learned to respond left to A, this response would
come under the control both of the cue actually presented
(A) and its associate (red). Small wonder then, that they
found it difficult to respond right to B, given that its
associate already controlled a tendency to make a different
response. For subjects in the consistent condition, on the
other hand, the response tendency acquired by red on a trial
with A would allow the correct response to emerge
immediately when B was presented. In a final test (Stage
3 of the table), subjects were asked to choose left or right
when presented with the colours used as associates in Stage
1. Those in the consistent condition made appropriate
choices (choosing left for red and right for green, in our
example), as would be expected if the associatively activated
representations of these colours had been involved in the
discrimination test of Stage 2.
Effects of Mere Exposure
My story has now run ahead of itself, and I must go
back to describe the work that we were doing in parallel
with that on acquired equivalence/distinctiveness in order
to investigate the enhanced discrimination produced by
mere preexposure to stimuli. For, however striking the
results supporting James’ associative theory, it was, of
course, obvious that this could not be the whole story –
preexposure is capable of enhancing discrimination even
when the stimuli are not followed by different consequences
during the preexposure phase. The effect was readily
demonstrated in experiments using the flavour-aversion
learning procedure in which rats were conditioned with one
compound flavour (AX) and generalization to another (BX)
was tested. (Here A and B represent distinctive flavours,
and X a third, added to each to render them more similar.)
It was easy to show that preexposure, consisting of
alternating trials with AX and BX, reduced generalization
from AX to BX – that is, increased the ability of the rat to
discriminate between them. This was true even when
comparison was made with a control procedure in which
the rats were given equivalent exposure to AX and BX, but
with the stimuli presented in separate blocks of trial rather
than intermixed. Figure 5 shows the design and results of
an experiment (Symonds & Hall, 1995) demonstrating just
such an effect.
This result turned out to be of particular significance.
For one thing, it appeared to rule out the possibility that
preexposure effects might be explained solely in terms of
latent inhibition. The opportunity for latent inhibition to
occur was the same in the two preexposure conditions—the
groups differed only in the schedule of stimulus presentation,
not in the amount of exposure—and yet the intermixed group
showed better discrimination than the blocked group.
Secondly, the result is just what would be expected on the
basis of Gibson’s (1969) understanding of the nature of
perceptual learning. Gibson took perceptual learning to be
a process that heightens the perceptual effectiveness of
features that distinguish between similar stimuli, a process
that is promoted by exposure in which the subject can
compare the stimuli. Reduced generalization after intermixed
preexposure matches this analysis perfectly. The intermixed
schedule is just the sort of arrangement that might be
expected to foster a comparison process; and one might
expect that generalization between AX and BX would be
reduced if the effective salience of the distinctive features,
A and B, was enhanced by preexposure. In this training
procedure, generalization will depend on the CR controlled
by the X component of the stimuli, and the presence of a
salient cue can be expected to interfere both with the
acquisition and the expression of this CR. That is, the salient
A will overshadow acquisition by X during conditioning;
the salient B will interfere with the ability of X to evoke
its CR in the generalization test.
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Figure 5. Design and results of an experiment by Symonds and
Hall (1995). Rats were given access to compound flavours, AX
and BX. Group I (intermixed) received preexposure in which the
compounds were presented on alternate trials; Group B (blocked)
experienced the compounds on separate blocks of trials. After
aversion conditioning with AX (+ represents an injection of lithium
chloride) generalization of the aversion to BX was tested.
Preexposure Conditioning Test
Group C – AX+ BX
Group I AX/BX/AX/BX… AX+ BX
Group B AX, AX…BX, BX AX+ BX
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But to say that this result is consistent with Gibson’s
(1969) account is not to show that that account is right.
Indeed, at the time we published our results we were aware
that the effect of schedule of exposure on generalization
could be explained in terms of an associative theory
proposed some years earlier, by McLaren, Kaye, &
Mackintosh (1989). McLaren et al. pointed out that
preexposure to AX and BX will allow the formation of
associations between the various elements of these
compound stimuli. In both the intermixed and blocked
schedules, excitatory within-compound (A-X and B-X)
associations can be expected to form. Additionally however,
standard principles of associative learning imply that the
intermixed procedure should allow the development of
inhibitory associations between the unique features (A and
B) of the preexposed stimuli. When it comes to testing BX
after conditioning with AX, for subjects that have received
blocked preexposure, responding will be partly determined
by the ability of X to contact a representation of the
unconditioned stimulus (US) by way of the associative
chain X-A-US. This indirect source of responding will not
be available to subjects that have been given intermixed
preexposure, for whom the presence of B on the test will
serve to inhibit activation of A. The result will be a less
extensive generalization after intermixed than after blocked
preexposure.
When I first came across this proposition it evoked a
range of reactions; the first was to think how silly of me
not to have come up with that myself; second was delight
at this demonstration of the explanatory power of a very
simple basic notion; third was the feeling that this
explanation was too good to be true – and so it proved.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence comes from
experiments using a within-subject version of the
experimental design depicted in Figure 5. This is shown as
Experiment 1 in Figure 6. The subjects (rats) received
intermixed preexposure to the compound stimuli AX and
BX, and a separate block of trials with CX. A response
subsequently conditioned to AX was found to generalise
less readily to BX (the stimulus presented intermixed with
AX during preexposure) than to the blocked stimulus, CX.
This constitutes a within-subject example of the effect
shown in Figure 5. This result in itself is compatible with
the suggestion that the presence of B on test inhibits
activation of the representation of the (conditioned) A
element. But the inhibition explanation cannot apply to the
modified design shown as Experiment 2 in the table. In
this, the intermixed preexposure procedure involved
alternation, not of AX and BX, but of BX and X alone.
Obviously inhibition between A and B cannot be established
with this procedure. None the less, conditioning to AX was
still found to generalize less well to BX than to CX on the
test. The experiment presented as Experiment 3 in the figure
makes the same point in a different way. Here conditioning
was given with a novel stimulus, but the same basic result
(less generalization to a compound containing B than a
compound containing C) was obtained. Since A is not
conditioned with this procedure, any ability that B might
have to inhibit activation of the A representation would be
irrelevant to the outcome.
Figure 6. A, B, C, represent flavours that could be presented in
compound with flavour X. In preexposure, AX was presented in
alternation with BX (or X). The CX compound was presented on
a separate block of trials. In the conditioning phase flavours were
presented along with (+) and aversive reinforcer. The test phase
measured the extent of the aversion shown to the test stimuli.
Experiments 1 and 3 were reported by Blair and Hall (2003), and
Experiment 2 by Hall et al. (2006).
Preexposure Conditioning   Test
Experiment 1 AX/BX _ CX AX+ BX and CX
Experiment 2 X/BX _ CX X+ BX and CX
Experiment 3 AX/BX _ CX Y+ BY and CY
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These new results fit with Gibson’s (1969) account as
it was outlined above. The opportunity for comparison
afforded by alternating presentations of AX and BX (or X
and BX) will enhance the perceptual effectiveness of the
distinguishing features of the stimuli (A and B in this case).
Performance on the generalization test will be largely
determined by the response that was established during the
conditioning phase (to X in Experiments 1 and 2; to Y in
Experiment 3). To the extent that the presence of another
element (such as B or C) detracts from the ability of the
animals to perceive stimulus the conditioned stimulus, the
magnitude of the response will be reduced. It follows that,
if alternating preexposure enhances the perceptual
effectiveness of the B element, this element will be better
able to interfere with the ability of X or Y to evoke its
response on test and generalization will be restricted – the
result obtained.
All this may seem a lot of work to establish what some
seemed to know from the outset. Gibson (1969) was very
clear that perceptual learning was not to be explained
associatively and involved a separate learning process that
heightened the perceptual effectiveness of the unique features
that distinguish between stimuli. But the journey really was
necessary. First it allowed us to establish that associative
processes might well play an important role in perceptual
learning effects (the acquired distinctiveness effect seems
evidence of that). Second, it is not enough simply to assert
that perceptual learning involves changes in perceptual
effectiveness; this needs to be demonstrated experimentally.
And finally, the challenge now becomes that of specifying
the nature of the learning process responsible for these
changes – we can hope that the experimental procedures
described here will be useful in that regard.
The Present
I will now outline two lines of work that I am currently
following that build on what has just been described. The
second deals directly with the mechanisms responsible for
changes in perceptual effectiveness; but before that I want
to describe our recent attempts to extend the generality of
our standard procedure for demonstrating a perceptual
learning effect.
Same-Different Judgments
The examples of perceptual learning described above
(Figure 6) all used the same basic test procedure –
conditioning followed by a generalization test. My
explanation of the outcome of these tests (that preexposure
produces changes in the perceptual effectiveness of features
of the stimuli) implies that the effect of preexposure should
be evident with other test procedures. I have attempted to
devise alternative tests in a series of experiments with rats
as the subjects (Blair, Wilkinson, & Hall, 2004); but an
alternative strategy is to make use of humans whose
discrimination can be tested by procedures that do not
involve explicitly reinforced training or generalization testing
– they can simply be instructed to report whether or not
they can perceive a difference between AX and BX.
I have just completed such a study (Mitchell, Kadib,
Nash, Lavis, & Hall, in press). The experimental subjects were
Australian undergraduates and the stimuli the checkerboards
shown in Figure 7. All had the same background (shown at
the bottom of the figure); this constituted the X stimulus.
Stimuli AX, BX, CX, and DX were prepared by adding a
(different) unique feature, shown outlined in black in Figure
7. (The black outline is for illustrative purposes and was not
present during experimental trials). With these stimuli we
could use the within-subject version of the intermixed/blocked
design. The students saw 60 presentations of each stimulus
(each of 470 ms, with an interval between trials of 2 s). In
the intermixed phase of two of the stimuli (AX and BX)
were presented on alternate trials; in the blocked phase,
presentation of CX were given consecutively, followed by
presentations of DX. (The order of these phases was
counterbalanced across subjects, as was the particular version
of the checkerboard designated as AX, BX, CX, or DX).
On the test trials the subjects saw stimuli presented in
pairs (one for 800 ms, a 550-ms gap, and then the second
for 800 ms). Their task was to simply to say “same” or
“different”. There were four types of trial: Those on which
the stimuli, AX and BX, that had been intermixed during
preexposure, were presented (intermixed different trials);
intermixed same, in which AX and AX (or BX and BX)
were presented; blocked different, in which CX and DX
were presented; and blocked same, in which CX and CX
(or DX and DX) were presented. The results (accuracy of
performance on these trials) are presented in Figure 8. It is
evident that accuracy in responding “same”, when identical
stimuli were presented, was high, making it impossible to
detect any difference between the intermixed and blocked
conditions, both for the intermixed and blocked stimuli. But
a difference was evident on the “different” trials. The
subjects continued to respond “same” to these (admittedly
rather similar) blocked stimuli, but responded “different” to
those given intermixed preexposure. Discrimination as
assessed by the same-different test is better after intermixed
than after blocked preexposure, an outcome readily explained
by the proposal that perceptual effectiveness of unique
features of the stimuli is higher after intermixed than after
blocked preexposure.
Previous studies of perceptual learning in humans have
used varied (and often exceedingly specialised) training
procedures (see Hall, in press), and these have tended to
give rise to ad hoc mini theories, devised solely to explain
the effects obtained within a particular experimental
paradigm. But what all these studies have in common (and
share with the example just described) is that the procedure
HALL226
Figure 7. The stimuli used in the experiment by Mitchell et al. (in press). The display at the bottom is the common background (X) used
for all stimuli. In the other four a distinctive feature has been added (a pattern of 6 adjacent coloured squares). These features are outlined
in black for the purpose of illustration.
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involves exposing people to similar stimuli that have a range
of common features (such as X) and distinctive features
(such as A and B). When discrimination is improved after
such experience —when the radiographer becomes able to
distinguish between the normal and abnormal X-ray, the
chicken-sexer between cocks and hens, or the experimental
participant between one checkerboard and another—this is
because their behaviour has come to be controlled by the
unique features of the stimuli rather than the common
features. It is time now to consider the mechanisms involved.
Learned Changes in Salience
So far I have talked glibly of changes in the “perceptual
effectiveness” of stimuli (or features of stimuli), offering
no definition or explication of the term. This has been
enough for our purposes up to this point, but when it come
mechanisms, more precision is needed. Specifically, we want
to able to integrate some account of the learning process
that produces changes in effectiveness with our existing
accounts of learning. My own attempt to do this (Hall, 2003)
took as its starting point the observation that formal theories
of learning, such as the Pearce-Hall (1980) model had two
parameters associated with the stimulus (or at least with the
CS): The associability parameter (discussed previously) and
a salience parameter (S), the value of which was set by the
intensity of the stimulus. Although our theories have usually
supposed that the salience of a given stimulus is fixed, I
proposed that it might change with experience and that
changes in perceptual effectiveness should be equated with
changes in the value of S. 
In fact the notion that salience can change is not all that
novel (at least for stimuli categorised as USs). Repeated
presentation of such a stimulus will produce habituation an
outcome has been taken as reflecting a reduction in the
sensitivity of the central representation of the stimulus, or,
equivalently, a loss of stimulus salience. For USs this loss will
show as reduction in the UR; for CSs the behavioural change
may be less evident but we may assume that the central
representation of the stimulus will undergo the same loss of
sensitivity. It is a straightforward matter to propose, therefore,
that the various prexposure procedures described above (such
as those summarised in Figure 6) might produce a loss of
salience. Less obvious is how such a loss might be reversed.
To take a specific example, consider the design listed as
Experiment 2 in Figure 6, which involved preexposure to
alternating BX and X trials plus a separate block of CX trials.
The test result showed that B was effectively more salient
than C. Loss of salience by C as a result of CX presentations
is no problem; but why does not B suffer the same loss during
BX trials? Its preexposure treatment differed from that given
to C only in that trials were alternated with presentations of
X alone. How could presentation of X alone influence the
sensitivity of the representation of B?
My answer to this latter question (Hall, 2003) was based
on the observation that the only obvious way in which an X
presentation might affect the B representation was by way
of associative learning. Trials with BX can be expected to
establish an excitatory association between X and B. On X-
alone trials, therefore, the representation of B will be activated
associatively. My further suggestion was that associative
activation of a representation has a different effect from that
produced by direct activation (i.e., by the presentation of the
stimulus itself). The latter produces habituation; my
suggestion was that associative activation reverses the
habituation process, restoring lost salience. Stimulus C will
simply lose salience during preexposure; for stimulus B, by
contrast, the presence of the alternated X  trials will oppose
this effect, leaving B more salient than C
I was pleased with this account – it had a nice symmetry
and appeared to fit the facts – but I was well aware that it
lacked empirical support. Recently I have been trying hard
to supply some. The design of one of our latest experiments
(Hall, Blair, & Artigas, 2006, Experiment 3a) is shown at
the top of Figure 9. There were two groups of rats, both
given essentially the same treatment as that depicted for
Experiment 2 in Figure 6; that is they received trials in which
presentations of the BX compound alternated with X and a
separate block of trials with the CX compound. The critical
difference was that in this experiment serial compounds were
used. The group labelled forward received access to X
followed immediately by access to B (and to X followed by
C on the blocked trials); the backward group received B (or
C) before X. The hypothesis under investigation holds that
the salience of B is restored on X-alone trials when X is able
to activate the representation of B associatively. This will be
Figure 8. Proportion of correct responses on the same-different task
used in the test phase of the experiment by Mitchell et al. (2007).
All participants had received preexposure to one pair of stimuli
presented on an intermixed schedule and to another pair presented
according to a blocked schedule.
Intermixed                    Blocked
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true for the forward group of the present experiment; that is
the forward pairings in X precedes B should establish X as
an excitatory CS for B. But it will not be the case for the
backward group; trials in which B precedes X cannot be
expected to establish the necessary association. The hypothesis
predicts therefore all the stimuli should lose salience, with
the exception of stimulus B for the forward, in which case
effective salience will be maintained.
The results of the experiment are shown at the bottom of
Figure 9. After flavour-aversion conditioning with X as the
CS, all the rats received two test trials with each of the
compounds, BX and CX. As conditioning had established an
aversion to X, levels of consumption on test were low
(consumption was less suppressed on the second test trial,
presumably reflecting extinction of the aversion). Critically,
suppression of consumption was found to be attenuated in just
one of the test conditions—that for rats in the forward group
given the BX compound. Only in this condition, we concluded,
had the preexposure procedure left the B stimulus with enough
salience that it could interfere with expression of the aversion
conditioned to X—just what the theory had predicted
The Future
It goes without saying that much more work along the
lines of the experiment just described will be needed to
evaluate properly the particular theory of salience change
being proposed here. But I want to move away from such
details and look at a somewhat bigger picture in considering,
in this final section of the paper, what research might be
needed in the future. I have three specific issues that I want
to mention, but each may be seen as a particular aspect of
a more general point, that I will come to finally.
First, we have now reached a theoretical position that
endows the CS with two parameters (associability and
salience) each of which can change with experience. To some
this may seem over-generous; but the notion has clear
psychological plausibility – I may well want to limit some
aspect of the attention I pay to an event whose consequences
are well known (I no longer need it to be high in associability)
while at the same time maintaining the attention needed to
respond appropriately when it appears (i.e., maintaining its
effective salience). It remains true, however, that with two
parameters free to vary, the theory runs the risk of being
dangerously flexible (and invulnerable to proof and disproof).
What is need for the future, therefore, is a precise specification
of the (different) learning rules that govern changes in
associability and in salience. I suspect that these will need to
be developed as a formal theory, the worth of which will be
established by its ability to make quite new predictions
The next issue concerns the need for the theory just
outlined to confront the persistent trickle of experimental
evidence taken to show that, in some circumstances, the
attention paid to stimuli can be enhanced by training in which
the cue is followed by a consistent consequence (for a recent
example see Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003). Some of the
experiments taken to show the acquired distinctiveness of cues
can be explained away in other terms (something I attempted
at length in my 1991 book); but there are other results (even
some supplied by me; Bonardi, Graham, Hall, & Mitchell,
2006) that seem to demand an attentional explanation. Do we
really need a third form of attention, in addition to the two
just described? Clearly we need at least to consider the
possibility when it comes to devising any new formal theory.
Third, almost all the discussion so far has been concerned
with the events that we usually categorise as CSs. But what
about USs? The possibility that the central representations
of these stimuli might be changed by experience has already
been acknowledged in our discussion of habituation. With
repeated presentation, the properties of an electric shock
appear to change – it hurts less; its effective salience declines.
If a US can suffer changes in salience, why not also changes
in other attentional parameters such as associability. And if
such changes can occur what might be the leaning rules that
govern them – will they be the same as for CSs or different?
The general point that underlies the three just made is my
feeling that we badly need an integrated theory that draws
Figure 9. Design and results of an experiment by Hall et al. (2006).
B, C, and X represent flavours. In preexposure X was presented
in alternation with the serial compound X followed by B (Forward
group) or B followed by X (Backward group). On a separate block
of trials, X and C were presented either in the forward or the
backward arrangement. Simultaneous compounds were tested after
aversion conditioning with X as the CS (X+).
Preexposure Conditioning   Test
Forward group X/X-B _ X-C X+ BX and CX
Backward group X/B-X _ C-X X+ BX and CX
together these various issues. They are not independent (they
are often very similar) but we have tended to develop separate
accounts for them. To give just one example, the US-
preexposure effect is explained in one way (e.g., as context
blocking or habituation) whereas latent inhibition  (the CS-
preexposure effect) gets a different set of explanations. Of
course, several processes may be operating concurrently, which
makes it all the more important to have a formal theory that
deals with them all. It also means that developing such a theory
will take a lot of work – but let’s hope not another 40 years.
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